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I. INTRODUCTION
When a case involves unprecedented punitive damages issues
arising from a "mass" or "cumulative" tort situation, it is ex-
tremely important that lawyers take a self-critical and professional
view of both parties' positions. Lawyers are often surprised by case
outcomes because they fail to thoroughly analyze the issues.
Rather, they rely on old habits formed through many years of
practice and precedent relating to single case litigation involving
only past conduct. In a mass tort punitive damages case, unques-
tioning reliance on these habits can lead to unexpected results.
The defense lawyer who is bewildered by an unexpected verdict
against his client may quickly blame "punitive damages." If he
proceeds without scrutinizing the factors at work, the defense at-
torney may consistently use the same tactics with even more disas-
trous results. Correspondingly, the plaintiff's lawyer may feel
particularly brilliant in achieving a verdict. The plaintiff's lawyer
who does not objectively analyze the situation may proceed with
false bravado to disastrous results in another case where the same
factors are not at work.
An objective overview will help attorneys assist the courts in ad-
justing to current needs and public policy concerns.I This analysis
will also help attorneys provide their clients with sound advice.
This Article is intended to provoke lawyers to objectively scruti-
nize their client's punitive damage claim, rather than to blindly
advocate their client's case. Minnesota law and public policy can
be furthered only if lawyers learn to employ this kind of objective
analysis.
II. THE RIGHT TO AND NECESSITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Before approaching the strategy and tactics involved in punitive
damages cases, it is necessary to consider the legal philosophy and
psychology of punitive damages affecting the implementation of
1. Public policy supports punitive remedies for their value as a deterrent to conduct
that willfully disregards the rights of others. See, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v.
Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 214 (1858); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurol-
ogy, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. 1982); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146,
150 (Minn. 1980); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 99-100, 213 N.W.2d 327, 331
(1973); Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284-85 (1952); Haugen &
Tarkow, Punitive Damages in Minnesota The Common Law and Developments Under Section
549.20ofthe Minnesota Statutes, 1I WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 353, 356-57 (1985); Comment,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A Look at a Newly Extended Doctrine, 7 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 185, 185-89 (1981).
[Vol. I11
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public policy by the courts. Neither the attorney pursuing a puni-
tive damages claim nor the trial court assigned the case must ac-
cept the attitude that punitive remedies are not as legitimate as
other more traditional remedies. To the contrary, the punitive
damages remedy is valuable to society as a deterrent of willful mis-
conduct. 2 Attorneys and trial courts often accept the antiquated
attitudes of appellate courts and commentators disfavoring puni-
tive remedies) These outmoded attitudes characterize punitive
damages as a criminal remedy or one which provides a windfall to
a plaintiff.
4
Despite these contrary attitudes, both the Minnesota legislature
and courts have expressly recognized a right to punitive damages
and the necessity for this remedy in order to deter willful disregard
of the rights of others.5 Indeed, all tort damages seemingly have a
deterrent effect. Minnesota has acknowledged, however, that a re-
covery limited to compensatory damages long after the injury has
occurred will not deter willful misconduct.6 This is particularly
true given the disparity of economic and information resources be-
tween individual victims and today's corporate institutions.
7
The Minnesota punitive damages statute" specifies and imple-
ments this public policy against willful indifference, 9 and creates a
2. Modern technology makes mass production and distribution of all kinds of prod-
ucts possible. Many of these products, such as drugs, see, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), automobiles, see, e.g., Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), and contraceptive
devices, see, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984), can cause serious
and permanent injury or death to consumers if they are defective. Punitive damages ide-
ally discourage manufacturers from knowingly marketing dangerous products for the sake
of profit. See supra note I and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-51 (2d Cir.
1967); Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882 884 (La. 1980); Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages
in Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 244, 250-51 (1977); Tozer, Punitive Damages and
Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNS. J. 300, 304 (1972); Willis, Measure of Damages When Prop-
erty is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1909).
4. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Linhibdiy Liigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1267
n.41 (1976) (listing the most frequently noted flaws in the doctrine of punitive damages).
5. See Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 312; Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727,
740-41 (Minn.), cert. denied sub nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980);
MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1982).
6. See Gyc, 297 N.W.2d at 732-33; cf. MINN. STAT. § 549.20.
7. See Gryc, 297 N.W.2d at 732-33. Indeed, the economic prospects of delaying or
reducing compensation by litigation can encourage willful misconduct if no punitive ele-
ment is present.
8. MINN. STAT. § 549.20.
9. The Minnesota statute provides: "Punitive Damages shall be allowed in civil ac-
tions only upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a will-
ful indifference to the rights or safety of others." Id., subd. 1.
1985]
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right to recover punitive damages' ° if the requirements stated in
the statute are fulfilled." The statute requires an award of puni-
tive damages to be determined by the following factors, which re-
flect the public policy behind punitive damages:
1. the seriousness of hazard to the public arising from the de-
fendant's misconduct;
2. the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
3. the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
4. the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and
of its excessiveness;
5. the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery
of the misconduct;
6. the number and level of employees involved in causing or
concealing the misconduct;
7. the financial condition of the defendant;
8. the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including
compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff
and other similarly situated persons;
9. the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant
may be subject.
12
The statute lays to rest any notion that punitive damages are a
criminal remedy. The last factor listed distinguishes punitive
damages imposed under the statute from penalties imposed by a
criminal conviction. 13 In addition, none of the statutory elements
contain any requirement of scienter or criminal intent on the part
of the defendant.'
4
The Minnesota statute also provides that the jury may consider
"other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct, including compensatory and punitive
damages awards to the plaintiff and other similarly situated per-
10. Seeid
I1. See id., subds. 1-3.
12. Id., subd. 3.
13. Id.
14. Nevertheless, the bulk of discovery requests directed to willful indifference usually
revolve around the questions of who knew what, when they knew it, and what they did
about it. See generally infta notes 54-80 and accompanying text (discussion of discovery).
The seriousness of the hazard and the profitability of the misconduct are also major dis-
covery themes. The seriousness of the hazard, however, is easily proven where injury is
caused. The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant can be difficult to ascertain
depending upon the nature of the accounting system, but gross sales are usually readily
ascertainable and admitted into evidence by the courts.
[Vol. I11
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sons.' 15 This provision eliminates the potential constitutional con-
cerns a defendant may raise regarding repeated punishment. The
defendant may prove that it either has been or will be punished
enough. 16
Before the punitive damages statute was enacted, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recognized that punitive damages were appropri-
ate and necessary to assist the tort system in deterring willful mis-
conduct.' 7 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet
considered what constitutes "willful indifference," in Gryc v. Day-
ton-Hudson Corp. l8 the court acknowledged the factors listed in the
trial court's jury instructions regarding whether a defendant had
acted in "willful, wanton and/or malicious disregard of the rights
of others" under existing common law.' 9 These factors mirror the
elements provided under the punitive damages statute20 and also
reflect the public policy concerns surrounding punitive damages:
1. the existence and magnitude of the product danger to the
public;
2. the cost or feasibility of reducing the danger to an accepta-
ble level;
3. the manufacturer's awareness of the danger, the magnitude
of the danger, and the availability of a feasible remedy;
4. the nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the manu-
facturer's failure to act appropriately to discover or reduce
the danger;
5. the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created
the danger;
6. the extent to which the defendants are subject to federal
safety regulation;
7. the probability that compensatory damages might be
awarded against defendants in other cases; and, finally,
8. the amount of time which has passed since the actions
15. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3.
16. The plaintiff, however, may also establish that the defendant has not been pun-
ished enough or that the defendant's conduct persists irrespective of actual judgments
against it. Id.
17. Set Ggyc, 297 N.W.2d 732-33, (quoting Owen, supra note 4, at 1258-60). In Gyc,
the court upheld a $1 million punitive damages award against the manufacturer of a
highly flammable fabric called "flannelette," which was used in children's pajamas. The
court found that consumers had no knowledge of the fabric's inherent danger, whereas the
manufacturer was "uniquely aware" of flannelette's flammable characteristics. Id. at 734,
739.
18. Id at 727.
19. Id. at 739-40.
20. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1985]
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sought to be deterred. 21
In acknowledging the right to punitive damages, the Gyc court
emphasized that compensatory damages, even when coupled with
the threat of lost sales and diminished reputation, are inadequate
to deter certain types of corporate conduct. 22 The Gryc court con-
cluded that since the evidence demonstrated that the punitive
damages award was reasonable and that the jury verdict was not
influenced by passion or prejudice, the one million dollar award
was not excessive.
23
The argument that punitive awards reflect either extraordinary
advocacy by plaintiffs' lawyers or unjustified passion by jurors is
generally unfounded. It is usually the conduct of the defendant,
both in and out of the courtroom, that is responsible for large
awards. A review of cases involving large punitive damages
awards discloses defendants who stretched credulity beyond any
degree of common sense and legal theories beyond the spirit of
their application. 24 In the process, these defendants demonstrated
both irresponsibility and arrogance. Defense lawyers have con-
sciously argued for the safety of clearly unsafe devices while claim-
ing that their clients should be rewarded for their conduct and
that injured victims should be turned away. In Gryc, for example,
the corporate defendant based its defense on a government flam-
mability standard for fabric which the company had lobbied for
while knowing that it would not assure safety.
25
21. Ggyc, 297 N.W.2d at 739.
22. See id. at 741. The court concluded that (a) punitive damages may be awarded in
strict liability actions, id at 733; (b) compliance with an applicable federal safety standard
does not preclude a punitive damages award as a matter of law, id at 737-38; and (c)
policy considerations do not preclude punitive damages in cases where there is potential
for multiple plaintiffs, id at 740-41.
23. Id. at 741.
24. See generally id. at 743 (defendant contended that opposing counsel's behavior de-
nied them a fair trial). In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1981), Ford was sued for the defective design of its Pinto automobile. The
plaintiffs suffered severe burns, resulting in one fatality, when the gas tank in their Pinto
exploded when the car was rear-ended. Id at 773, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359. On appeal, Ford
claimed that the plaintiffs' counsel had committed misconduct. Ford alleged that the
counsel's misconduct included violations of in limine orders regarding examination ques-
tions that went beyond the scope of the record and suggested that Ford was guilty of
criminal misconduct. Id at 793, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The court held that Ford failed to
show that the alleged misconduct could not have been remedied at trial with a proper
objection. Id at 798, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 376. Ford's list of baseless allegations illustrates a
defendant who refuses to follow common sense and stretches his appeal to include unnec-
essary claims.
25. Gqvc, 297 N.W.2d at 733-34. The defendant argued that since the flannelette had
passed the federal threshold test for fire resistant fabric, the company could not be held
[Vol. I1I
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Defense lawyers often anger juries by making these contradic-
tory arguments regarding the liability issue. Typically, the de-
fendant's attorney asserts a tripartite defense: (1) there is nothing
wrong with the product; (2) if there is, the product did not cause
the injury; and (3) even if the product did cause the injury, it was
the plaintiffs own fault.26 At the same time, defense counsel ar-
gues that if the jurors find a defect and willful disregard, they
should overlook the defendant's denials of liability since the com-
pany is sincerely sorry and is doing its best to prevent future inju-
ries. Under the Minnesota punitive damages statute, juries are
instructed to measure punitive damages by the "attitude and con-
duct of the defendant." 27 The defendant only invites a large
award by feigning innocence and asserting innumerable defenses
when some managers or officers have in fact acted culpably.
Corporate institutions bring other defenses to bear which create
disfavor toward the punitive damages remedy. 28 One such ploy
occurs when a corporate defendant facing a punitive damages suit
claims that its "survival" is being jeopardized. 29 This argument
evokes the old adage, "What is good for General Motors is good
for America," and ignores the seriousness of the victim's injury, the
ongoing misconduct of the defendant, and the callousness of the
corporation's behavior. The extent to which this argument vio-
lates our notions of equal justice is demonstrated by applying the
same defense in a situation involving only an unintentional tort.
liable. Id The trial court held that the company was liable because it knew that the test
was improper at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Id.
26. See, e.g., id. at 732. The defendants in Gryc alleged that (1) the flannelette met the
federal safety standards, so it was not defective, id at 733; (2) the design of the pajamas-
not the fabric-caused the injury, id at 742; and (3) the child and her mother were con-
tributorily negligent, id. at 743.
27. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3.
28. For example, a bill introduced in the United States Senate and lobbied for by
large corporations virtually eliminates punitive damages by proposing that these damages
be limited to the first person who brings suit against the manufacturer of a harmful prod-
uct. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 15, 60 (1984); see also Dentzer, The
Products Liability Debate, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54, 56. The proposed Products
Liability Act would essentially eliminate strict products liability and require the return of
a negligence standard. Dentzer, supra, at 54. The bill was introduced by Senator Robert
Kasten (R. Wis.) and originally co-sponsored by Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R. Minn.). Id
The proposed goal of the bill is to provide uniformity in products liability law. The bill
has been heavily criticized for depriving consumers of adequate redress for injuries caused
by defective products. See, e.g., Shrager, Products Liablity Law-A Legal Saga of Consumer
Protection, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at 4. The bill is supported by President Reagan and many
industry leaders who have spent millions lobbying for it. Dentzer, supra, at 56.
29. See, e.g., Gryc, 297 N.W.2d at 740-41.
1985]
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An individual faced with possible bankruptcy for the consequences
of mere negligence could not honestly make the "survival" argu-
ment and expect to avoid or minimize the consequences of his neg-
ligence. Even more so, a defendant who acts in reckless disregard
of the rights of others should also be denied this defense.
The economic consequences of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages in excess of a corporation's net worth seem misunderstood.
The popular misconception is that the corporation and its produc-
tivity can be destroyed by a punitive damages judgment. Such a
judgment, however, only changes management responsibility and
shareholder values. In finding a corporation liable, some courts
have considered management, rather than shareholders, as respon-
sible for the wanton, reckless, and intentional acts of the corpora-
tion. 30 Subsequently, courts have imposed liability on
shareholders of commercial corporations that acted in reckless dis-
regard of people and their property. 3' Management changes
forced by shareholders reacting to large punitive damages awards
due to irresponsible conduct, or the outright sale of corporate divi-
sions to responsible companies, are examples of the prospects that
may result if the enunciated public policy of punitive damages has
the desired impact and deterrent effect. Thus, although the threat
to vested management interests and the value of stockholdings
may be substantial, the threat to corporate productivity is
minimal.
Whether the public policy enunciated in Minnesota's statute
will be consistently enforced remains in doubt. Despite the public-
ity afforded to large awards, 32 relatively few verdicts are returned
and fewer still are upheld on appeal. The publicity afforded puni-
30. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 1967) (puni-
tive damages imposed on a corporation if its management approves or takes part in the
act). New York does not impose punitive damages against a corporation unless "the of-
ficers or directors, that is, the management [of a company or relevant division] . . . either
authorized, participated in, consented to or, after discovery, ratified the conduct." Id at
842.
31. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 811 (6th Cir. 1982).
In Moran, the officials responsible for the business decisions resulting in the plaintiffs inju-
ries had since left the corporation. Id. at 816. The court stated, "It is the agency at the
time of the tortious act, not at the time of litigation, that determines the corporation's
liability." Id at 817. The court added that sustaining the defendant's claim of nonliabil-
ity on this basis would impenetrably shield the corporation from punitive damages. Id at
817.
32. See, e.g., A.H- Robins Won't Appeal Negligence Award, Wash. Post, June 19, 1984, at
DI, col. 1; Court Upholds S1.75 Million Award in Burn Suit, Minneapolis Star & Trib., May
24, 1980, at A7, col. 5.
[Vol. I11
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tive damages awards vastly outstrips any real deterrent impact or
effective application of the public policy. The punitive damages
award of $125 million in Grimshaw v. FordMo/or Co.33 was well pub-
licized due to its size.34 The magnitude of the Grinshaw verdict
provided a warning to corporations. Yet the warning has gone
unheeded. In 1983, for example, the United States Department of
Transporation cited General Motors for intentionally and know-
ingly marketing 1.1 million "X" cars with defective brakes.
35
Courts often appear more concerned with the size of an individ-
ual award 36 than with the statutory elements and the realistic
amount needed to carry out the policy of deterrence. Some courts
are unwilling to look at the real economic consequences or why
willful misconduct has not been deterred. 37 They fail to realize
that a victim injured by intentional, willful, or reckless disregard
often has no insurance to pay for his damages or attorney's fees
and costs. The victim is similarly without power to prevent injury
to others similarly exposed. The institutional defendant, however,
usually has insurance to cover the victim's compensatory damages
and its own defense fees and costs. In many jurisdictions, punitive
damages may also be covered by insurance. 38 In light of these re-
33. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
34. The original amount was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million at a new trial. Id.
at 821-23, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 389-91.
35. US Releases Data on X-Car Defect, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at BI6, col. 1.
36. For example, the Grzns-haw court approved the lower court's reduction of the
plaintiff's damages from an amount which might effectively deter a corporation as large as
Ford ($125 million), to an amount which was comparatively ineffective ($3.5 million).
119 Cal. App. 3d at 821-23, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 389-91.
37. For example, General Motors had what appears to be its best year in 1983. See
N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at DI, col. 6 (GM reported third quarter net income rose
nearly sixfold, to $723 million, compared with $129.4 million in same period last year).
The chief executive officer of the A.H. Robins Company, which has been embroiled in
litigation involving the Dalkon Shield since 1972, testified in September of 1983 that the
litigation had not cost the company anything because the company was backed by $410
million in insurance coverage. During that period, A.H. Robins rose to become a Fortune
500 company.
38. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440
S.W.2d 582 (1969); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 IIl. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124
(1969); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981); First Bank Billings v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 679 P.2d 1217 (1984); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d
908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313, 404 A.2d 101 (1979); Hensley v. Erie Ins.
Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d
975 (Wyo. 1984). But see Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d
522 (1972); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J. Super. 10, 410 A.2d
696 (1980); Butler v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 265 Or. 473, 509 P.2d 1184 (1973).
19851
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alities, the defense of economic hardship is meritless.
III. WHEN TO ASSERT A PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM
As long as court and corporate attitudes frustrate the implemen-
tation of a strong public policy and overlook the actual economics
of both business and litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys must carefully
consider whether or not to include a claim for punitive damages.
Without a punitive damages element, outraged juries are known
to include a punitive element in their compensatory verdicts.3 9 A
punitive count permits the issue to be isolated and subject to judi-
cial control. Therefore, the attitude of a particular court towards
punitive damages awards needs to be evaluated. For example, in
some jurisdictions, a compensatory award of $1,250,000 may be
sustained while an award of $750,000 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 in punitive damages may be subject to reduction or
elimination of the punitive element.
Another point to consider before asserting a punitive damages
claim is its effect on a potential settlement. While logic suggests
that a punitive claim should cause the defendant who knows that
it acted irresponsibly to settle quickly, the opposite result often oc-
curs. A defendant who has multiple individual exposures and am-
ple coverage for all litigation expenses and compensatory damages,
but no coverage for punitive damages, may attempt to reduce the
exposure of its own assets by delaying settlements and litigating
each case. The defendant will persistently reject any punitive fac-
tor in settlement negotiations and appeal all actual awards. The
last move the defendant may make is a quick appearance at the
bargaining table where value "precedent" can be set.
40
IV. INSURANCE AND SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In cumulative tort cases, plaintiffs' attorneys and courts must
give greater attention to insurance coverage issues than was histor-
ically given in single case litigation. The duty to defend and the
conflicts that develop between the insurer, the insured, and their
39. See, e.g., Moore v. Fisher, 117 Minn. 339, 343-44, 135 N.W. 1126, 1128 (1912)
(large compensatory award upheld because no evidence of passion or prejudice was indi-
cated, although the court did mention that the jury could have included assessment of
punitive damages in its award).
40. Other factors may bear upon the defendant's attempt to set a value irrespective of
the existence of past harm or the future potential for harm. These may include corporate
business decisions, internal politics, marketing plans, financing, acquisitions, sales, and
stock offerings.
[Vol. I11
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counsel are very significant. From the court's standpoint, the pub-
lic policy favoring statutory punitive damages and the relevance of
both compensatory and punitive exposure to the defendant under
that statute will require consideration of a number of insurance-
related factors. These include the admissibility of insurance cover-
age limits; whether the limits apply to defense costs as well as in-
demnity; and whether punitive damages will be covered. From
the plaintiffs' standpoint, the potential conflicts between the in-
surer and insured can create the economic leverage needed to en-
able or maximize settlements.
Many lawyers assume that punitive damages are not covered by
insurance policies. This assumption is based on older precedent
that disallowed insurance coverage for punitive damages under
the belief that defendants should personally be punished. 4' This
can be a costly mistake. Many of these older cases involve the
truly intentional tort as distinguished from "wanton and reckless"
conduct. 42 Since some courts are willing to liberalize coverages for
corporate defendants, they may also opt for punitive coverage
where the actions and results are less than intentional.
The large corporate defendant typically has many primary and
excess insurers during the time a particular product is manufac-
tured and marketed. There is a great deal of developing law
which relates to the coverage that may be applicable to injuries
caused by the product. 43  In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
41. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 528 (10th Cir. 1966) (public
policy forbids contracts insuring against punitive damage awards); Northwestern Nat'l
Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962) (public policy of punishing
and deterring defendant prohibits construction of insurance policies to cover liability for
punitive damages); Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 53
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (public policy precludes allowing motorist to shift responsibility
for punitive damages penalty to an insurance company); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (if defendant could shift burden of punitive damages award to gar-
nishee, then award would have served no purpose); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem.
Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (it is contrary to public policy for insurer to
indemnify vehicle operator as to punitive damages against the willful wrongdoer), cert.
denied, 42 N.J. 144, 199 A.2d 655 (1964).
42. Crull, 382 S.W.2d at 21-22 (wanton and reckless acts differ subtly from intentional
acts so as to allow insurers to deny coverage under a policy that does not cover injuries
intentionally caused).
43. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(policies applicable to varying time periods held to provide coverage if there was either
manifestation of or exposure to injury during the policy period), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980) (court applied exposure theory, obligating insurers to defend suits brought against
manufacturers by individuals who contracted disease due to asbestos exposure during the
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Amerca,44 policies applicable to varying time periods were held to
provide coverage if there was either manifestation of asbestos-re-
lated diseases or exposure to asbestos during the policy period.45
Even if the injury manifests itself years after an insurance policy
period expires, that policy will apply if the exposure to injury took
place within the policy period. Thus, the existence and extent of
the defendant's insurance coverage in cumulative tort situations
cannot be determined by simply discovering the amount of cover-
age applicable in the year injury occurred. These commercial in-
surance arrangements can also contain very complex deductible or
retention arrangements under which the degree of exposure re-
tained by the defendant must be ascertained.
46
Plaintiffs' lawyers must also demand production of any interim
defense agreements. These agreements are typically entered into
between insurers and insureds in cumulative tort situations.47 The
agreements state the means by which claims will be dealt with
pending resolution of potential coverage controversies, or measure-
ment of the totality of claims and coverage. The parties to these
agreements tend to reserve their rights and provide for coverage
litigation at a later time.
Policy limit demands can encourage settlement and create con-
flict between the insurer and insured where coverage is not com-
plete.48 This is especially true in jurisdictions, such as Minnesota,
that have adopted the minority rule that standard liability insur-
time insurers provided coverage, rather than the manifestation theory, which would have
obligated insurers to defend suits brought by individuals manifesting injury during the
period of coverage); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973)
(although plaintiff's bodily injury resulted from an assault and battery, exclusion in de-
fendant's liability insurance policy for "bodily injury ... caused intentionally by or at the
direction of the insured" did not relieve insurer of liability where jury found that defend-
ant did not intend to cause bodily harm).
44. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
45. Id at 1047.
46. When more than one policy applies to a loss, the insurers' liability is apportioned
according to the "Other Insurance" provisions of each policy. Id at 1050.
47. The insurer is bound to defend the insured against suits alleging circumstances
covered by the policy. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682, at 16
(1979). Nevertheless, the insurer's duty to defend is only contractual. If there is no con-
tract to defend, there is no duty to defend. Id. at 27.
48. An insurer may be subject to a bad faith claim by its insured if it has refused to
settle for an amount within the insured's policy limits, and the damages after litigation
exceed the policy's coverage. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 7.8
(1971).
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ance policies do not provide coverage for punitive damages. 4 9 As-
sume, for instance, that a defense lawyer evaluates a compensatory
claim at $500,000 and also observes an uncertain exposure to his
client for punitive damages. The plaintiffs lawyer evaluates the
maximum compensatory value of the case at $1 million and a po-
tential additional $1 million in punitive damages based on willful
misconduct. The defense lawyer believes his client can win the
punitive damages claim, but that the probabilities favor a plain-
tiff's verdict for compensatory damages. The policy limits are $1
million and the case is venued in Minnesota where the policy may
not insure punitive damages. If the plaintiffs lawyer makes a set-
tlement demand for the policy limits, the insured defendant may
support that demand to avoid any punitive exposure to the corpo-
rate assets. The insurer may be hard pressed to refuse payment of
the demand because of its potential responsibility should the case
go to trial. Its insured could be assessed with a multimillion dollar
award at trial and subsequently make a bad faith claim against
the insurer for amounts in excess of the policy limits.
V. PRETRIAL STRATEGY
A. The Changing Focus
Courts and lawyers have a tendency to freeze issues in time.
The legal community is trained to handle an individual case in
which the facts are long past. In contrast, cumulative tort cases
tend to grow from an evidentiary standpoint. They change with
time in the sense that the defendant's litigation tactics become
part of the defendant's overall pattern of conduct. Thus, cases in-
volving early sales of a defective product may not involve punitive
issues while later cases may involve overwhelming punitive con-
duct because a cover-up or other willful activity is initiated by
overzealous officers or attorneys. Similarly, evidence concerning
the defectiveness of a product may be marginal in early cases but
reach levels beyond a reasonable doubt as evidence of defect, haz-
ard, and injury mounts. Lawyers and courts need to understand
that early trials rarely involve the same evidence or conduct as
subsequent cases. These differences have a profound impact on
how the courts consider and adapt to issues such as the work prod-
uct privilege as applied to cumulative tort cases. 50
49. See Caspersen, 298 Minn. at 99-100, 213 N.W.2d at 331 (punitive damages were not
awarded because of bodily injury, so policy did not cover the punitive damages).
50. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the work product doctrine).
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In the work product area injuries may continue to arise after the
first suit related to a product is filed. The corporate defendant
may seek to shield all knowledge subsequently acquired from ex-
perts and investigators under the work product privilege. 51 Even if
every expert contacted by the defendant has opined that the de-
vice is defective and even though every device the defendant has
tested has failed, the defendant will urge that this was done by the
lawyer in the context of earlier litigation. Lawyers may try to
shield the manufacturer from that knowledge even though that
knowledge should have compelled the manufacturer to warn other
potential victims to prevent the subsequent injuries. If the plain-
tiffs attorney is to be successful in obtaining this material through
discovery, he must be aware that it is likely to be in the possession
of the defendant's attorney, rather than the defendant. The plain-
tiff may overcome the defendant's work product claim by pointing
out the absurdity of allowing the defendant's attorney to shield the
corporation from knowledge upon which the corporation would
otherwise have a legal duty to act. The court can protect materials
from discovery that are legitimately work product by appointing a
master to review the information.52 In this manner, the plaintiff's
lawyer may be able to prevent the work product privilege from
becoming a shield to conceal evidence that is not only relevant to
defendant's ongoing duty to warn, but which may also reveal will-
ful violations of the law.
While it is important that courts permit discovery of informa-
tion before trial, it is equally important that courts permit the
presentation of relevant if repetitious evidence at trial. For exam-
ple, the number and level of employees involved in causing or con-
cealing the misconduct is relevant under the Minnesota punitive
damages statute.5 3 Historically, courts are very impatient with
The changing focus effect also poses collateral estoppel issues. For example, in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court held that the law of collateral estop-
pel forecloses relitigation of factual issues which were determined in a previous action. Id
at 332-33. As applied to mass tort litigation, once a product has been held by a jury to be
unreasonably dangerous, the defendant would be collaterally estopped from trying to
prove otherwise in subsequent litigation involving the same product.
51. According to Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, material pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation is only discoverable if the party can show a "substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3). This "material prepared in anticipation of litigation" is commonly re-
ferred to as "work product."
52. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 53.03.
53. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3. "Any award of punitive damages shall be
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repetitious evidence. In these cases, however, courts must be re-
minded that repetitious evidence may be necessary to accurately
portray the degree of awareness within a large corporation. The
plaintiff should be allowed to present copies of numerous docu-
ments to the jury which were distributed among forty or fifty of-
ficers, employees, or board members over a significant time span.
Without this evidence, the plaintiff will be prevented from estab-
lishing the defendant's awareness of the situation by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Courts must realize that in many punitive
damages cases the conduct of the defendant is a larger issue than
the defect. Courts, therefore, must allow tailoring of discovery and
trial practices to effectuate the public interest in deterring
misconduct.
B. Specifi D'scover) and Pretrial Tactics
1. D'scovey and Information Gatheri'ng
a. Product Testing
Both the failure to test and the failure to act upon the informa-
tion obtained from testing can serve as an important basis for pu-
nitive damages.54 In Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 5 the fifth circuit
reinstated a punitive damages award because the defendant had
ignored crash test results revealing that in a thirty-mile-per-hour
crash, an average male would strike the dashboard even while
wearing lap and shoulder restraints.56 In the Mer/29 cases, the
measured by those factors which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, in-
cluding . . . the number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the
misconduct." Id
54. See id. "Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors which
justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including. . . the degree of the defend-
ant's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness, [and] the attitude and the conduct
of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct." Id
55. 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), modifedper curtam on other grounds, 670 F.2d 21, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
56. See id. at 653. The Dorsey court reinstated damages in the amount of $5 million.
Id at 652. The crash that caused Dorsey's serious injuries was equivalent to a 20-mile-
per-hour crash. Id at 653.
Similarly, in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d
568 (1981), the court held that punitive damages were proper where a manufacturer's
testing of a Jeep CJ-7 was so inadequate as to manifest a flagrant indifference to the
probability that the product might expose consumers to unreasonable risk of harm. Id at
472-73, 424 N.E.2d at 573. Appellants, American Motors Corp., responded to interrogato-
ries by stating that no "proving ground," "vibration or shock," or "crash" tests were ever
conducted on the Jeep CJ-7's roll bar, the collapse of which greatly aggravated the plain-
tiff's injuries. Id. at 472, 424 N.E.2d at 573.
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defendant falsified laboratory test data and intentionally withheld
other test data from the Food and Drug Administration.5 The
plaintiff was awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages.
58
Given the law's intolerance of inadequate testing, this informa-
tion is essential to the plaintiffis case. Interrogatories and docu-
ment requests must be developed to discover testing standards and
activities. Reports of government agencies or memoranda ob-
tained through the Freedom of Information Act 59 are also helpful
since they frequently document product experience.
b. Internal Recommendations for Safety Improvements
Throughout the design process, the manufacturer may generate
memoranda concerning design changes and other recommenda-
tions for safety improvements. These documents may be vital to
obtaining and keeping a punitive damages award. In Dorsey,
Honda ignored an employee's recommendation to enlarge the ve-
hicle for added safety. 60 Similarly, the Giyc "powder keg" memo-
randum 61  demonstrates the importance of obtaining such
memoranda.
62
Document requests are the key to discovering documentary evi-
dence of a defendant's actual knowledge. The "smoking gun" is
the most persuasive evidence of culpability. In addition, plaintiffs'
57. Toole v: Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967). Toxicology tests began in 1957 when MER/29 was administered to rats. In its
1959 FDA application requesting permission to market MER/29, the company reported
that four out of eight rats died in one study when in fact all eight had died. Fictitious
weights and blood tests were reported for dead rats as if they were still living and being
studied. False results were also reported on a sample of monkeys that had been adminis-
tered MER/29. Id at 695-96, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The FDA required further testing,
which revealed significant instances of eye opacities. None of the information regarding
eye opacities was reported to the FDA. Id at 697, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 405. As a result of
using MER/29, the plaintiff developed cataracts in both eyes. Id. at 694, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
403.
58. Id at 693, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403. The plaintiff stipulated to a reduction of the
punitive damages from $500,000 to $250,000 to avoid a new trial. Id. at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr.
at 418.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
60. 655 F.2d at 653.
61. 297 N.W.2d at 734. In 1956, one of the defendant-manufacturer's top officials
wrote in a memorandum entitled "Flammability-Liability," which stated, "'We are al-
ways sitting on somewhat of a powder keg as regards our flannelette being so inflamma-
ble.'" Gorc, 297 N.W.2d at 734.
62. See generally Owen, Problems itn Assessing Punitive Damages Agabist Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1982).
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attorneys should consider deposing former employees, other claim-
ants, experts who have given notice of defects to the company, and
legal assistants or lawyers who have been responsible for the han-
dling of documents in large cases.
The information gathered by a defendant's experts in other
cases can be a dramatic source of information. In Stambaugh v. In-
ternational Harvester Co.,63 the court permitted the plaintiff to intro-
duce the opinion of an expert from the defendant's company who
investigated a similar product defect in a different case, despite the
defendant's work product objection.
64
The existence of safety devices which a defendant could have
incorporated into its product may be disclosed by an investigation
of patents relating to the products involved. Patents protecting
the specific product may be obtained from the patent office or the
defendant. In some cases, discovery may even reveal that the de-
fendant owns the patent on a product incorporating the safety de-
vice. Patents on similar products should also be investigated.
c. Advertising Claims and Failure to Warn
Two additional factors are common in products liability cases
awarding punitive damages: the manufacturer's failure to warn of
its product's potential dangers, and the manufacturer's tendency
to exaggerate in advertising its product's benefits without also
warning of risks involved. In Gryc, the defendant claimed that it
was not feasible to warn consumers because a warning would stig-
matize its product. 65  The court found that this argument
amounted to an admission that the defendant was protecting the
market of a product which consumers might deem unreasonably
dangerous. 66 In Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.,67 the manufac-
turer's promotion of off-the-road use of its Jeep cJ-7, while provid-
ing a roll bar that did little more than add "rugged good looks,"
was a sufficient basis to award punitive damages.68
Because the defendant's knowledge of the defect is relevant to a
63. 106 Il1. App. 3d 1, 435 N.E.2d 729 (1982) (appellate court affirmed decision, but
reduced award of punitive damages where defendant tractor manufacturer was held liable
for defect in tractor gas cap).
64. Id at 5-6, 435 N.E.2d at 735 (expert allowed to testify concerning pressure release
capabilities of tank gas cap in different type of tractor).
65. See Grvc, 297 N.W.2d at 739-40.
66. Id.
67. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
68. See id at 457, 424 N.E.2d at 580.
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punitive award, prior consumer complaints establishing notice and
knowledge of the defect are critical. In Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak,69
the plaintiff, who had stepped out of her brand new 1977 Ford
SMX to close the driveway gate, was killed when the car appar-
ently self-shifted into reverse and rolled over her.70 The court, in
finding that the defendant had knowledge of a defect, noted that
from 1971 to 1976 Ford had received 728 reports of accidents at-
tributable to SMX transmission failure.71 These complaints led to
a design revision recommendation to remedy the problem at a cost
of only three cents per car.72 The recommendation was ignored
and only the consumers purchasing Fords after November 1976
were warned of the defect. 73 The court noted that this overdue
warning was insufficient to rectify the dangerous condition.74 In
Slambaugh, the court stated, "Evidence of other sufficiently related
accidents, although not competent for the purpose of showing in-
dependent acts of negligence, may be admissible to show notice to
the defendant that conditions were unsafe and that unsafe condi-
tions caused other accidents." 75 Some courts have tended to be too
restrictive and have admitted other injuries only as to the issue of
notice, when that evidence may be necessary and relevant to prove
actual knowledge, hazard, and defect.7 6
Interrogatories and document requests should be used to dis-
cover design planning, research and development, design changes,
manufacturing standards and activities, and the chain of corporate
command with respect to design planning, manufacturing, mar-
keting, and component part suppliers, as well as other claims or
suits. Depositions should include the corporate hierarchy and the
69. 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
70. Id at 586.
71. Id at 593-94. Over the same period, Ford also received reports of 234 accidents
apparently caused by the backing up of unattended SMX cars. Id
72. Id at 595. The recommendation also noted that the design revision would correct
the problem in 95% of the cases. Id
73. Id. at 596.
74. Id
75. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 20, 435 N.E.2d at 743.
76. See, e.g., Johnson v. Amerco, Inc., 87 Ill. App. 3d 827, 846-49, 409 N.E.2d 299,
314-15 (1980) (court found accidents were not of sufficient similarity and concluded that
any probative value was outwieghed by the potential for prejudice); Ray v. Cock Robin,
Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 19, 22, 310 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1974) (evidence of other sufficiently related acci-
dents may be used to show notice of the existence of an unsafe condition and that the
unsafe condition caused other accidents). But see Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187
(Colo. 1984) (discussing the legitimate application of evidence of other claims or injuries
on all issues). See generally 2 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 252, 442, 458 (1961).
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individuals charged with safety, labeling, advertising, marketing,
and design.
d Ratiftation of Contract at Appropriate Level of Management
Corporations often attempt to shield top officers from acquiring
information concerning possible misconduct by the company.
Very few of the reported cases discuss the issue of contract ratifica-
tion. In Tole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,77 however, the court found
that because the defendant had been conducting experiments for
several years, the jury could reasonably infer that management
had some knowledge of the test results, especially since other evi-
dence disclosed great company interest and enthusiasm for the
product. 78 Particularly in cumulative tort situations, it is very im-
portant to take depositions of officers at an early stage to apprise
them of the evidence so that if the company later fails to act, the
officers cannot deny knowledge of the hazard or problem with re-
spect to future cases. Even where that need does not exist, it is
wise to take depositions of corporate officers to pin them down on
their ratification of the actions or inactions of subordinates.
e. Net Worth
Since Minnesota's Punitive Damages Statute requires considera-
tion of "the financial condition of the defendant,' 79 evidence es-
tablishing the wealth of the defendant is admissible.80 With
respect to public companies, this information can be obtained
from published financial statements such as annual reports or the
public documents filed for securities purposes. In some instances
accountants' testimony and opinions by appraisers and stock ana-
lysts may be necessary. In obtaining financial information, it is
important to consider both book value and market value, since the
higher figure should be presented to the jury. With respect to pri-
vately held companies, interrogatories and document requests may
be used to discover net worth and insurance information.
77. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
78. Id at 701-02, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
79. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3.
80. SeegenerallvJ. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5.36 (1983) (discussing wealth of defendant as evidentiary concern).
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2. Defendant 's Pretrial Motions and Tactzcs
a. Protective Orders
Defendants routinely demand protective orders restricting docu-
ments in cumulative tort cases to the specific case at hand. Plain-
tiffs' lawyers and courts should hesitate before agreeing to broad
protective orders because defendants often seek such orders to pre-
vent plaintiffs' lawyers from cooperating with information while
the defendant coordinates its evidence throughout the country.
The tactic, if successful, causes other courts to start discovery from
scratch.
b. Demands by Defendant That Plaintiffs' Lawyers Refuse Additional
Representation
Offers of settlement from a defendant to the plaintiffs' lawyer
who is handling a number of the product liability claims often de-
mand that the plaintiffs' lawyer refuse to take additional related
cases. Accepting this offer could violate the ethical code.81 In ad-
dition, defendants may demand as a condition of settlement that
the plaintiffs' lawyer refuse to supply other lawyers or claimants
with documentary, demonstrative, or expert evidence, thus depriv-
ing claimants and courts from learning about or utilizing existing
evidence. The ethical implications of these demands are serious.
The demand automatically places the plaintiffs' lawyer in a very
difficult ethical conflict between his obligation to represent the
public and his obligation to pursue the rights of his existing
clients.8
2
Another tactic, which appears to violate rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,8 3 is a settlement made without a satisfac-
tion and conditional upon agreement by the plaintiffs' lawyer not
81. "In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not
enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (1979).
82. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon I with id. Ca-
non 6.
83. Rule II provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
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to oppose motions by the defendant to vacate the judgment. By
this means, a defendant attempts to effectively erase verdicts so
that it can create barriers to collateral estoppel by asserting to
other courts that cases were settled. 84 When these conditions are
coupled with a confidentiality agreement concerning the amount
of the settlement, other courts and attorneys may never learn that
the settlement actually involved payment of the full judgment plus
interest.
c. Bifurcatton Motions
The defense usually attempts to bifurcate the punitive damages
trial.8 5 Some commentators have supported this procedure in tort
litigation, largely based on the premise that two different burdens
of proof will be involved in the trial of the case. 86 To preclude
bifurcation, plaintiffs' lawyers may argue that the motion is in fact
an effort by the defendant to assert contradictory arguments; that
is, an opportunity to use a tripartite defense while holding back
the completely inconsistent mea culpa defense. 87 Bifurcation may
benefit the plaintiff, however, where the evidence of the defect and
the issues relating to punitive damages are significantly different.
Nevertheless, this circumstance is unusual in products cases. The
plaintiffs' lawyers must be alert to the tendency of some courts to
prejudge the validity of a punitive claim based on the strength of
84. See supra note 50 (discussing collateral estoppel concerns).
85. A bifurcated trial divides the issues in a single case into two parts. The findings
on each set of issues are made in separate proceedings. In a punitive damages trial, bifur-
cation means deciding the compensatory damage issues separately from the punitive dam-
age issues. See Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 374, 394-95, 196 Cal. Rptr.
117, 129-30 (1983) (allowing bifurcation); Newton v. Yates, 170 Ind. App. 486, 488, 353
N.E.2d 485, 488 (1976) (allowing bifurcation); Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d
543, 548, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1979) (denying bifurcation). See generally J. GHIARDI &
J. KIRCHER, supra note 80, §§ 12.01-. 13 (discussing bifurcation).
86. See, e.g., Fulton, Punitoe Damages in Product Liability Cases, 15 FORUM 117, 129-30
(1980). The plaintiff in a civil action has the burden of proving the requisite elements of
his cause of action by a preponderance of the credible evidence. See, e.g., Trimbo v. Min-
nesota Valley Natural Gas Co., 260 Minn 386, 110 N.W.2d 168 (1961) (in a civil case, a
party need only prove its case by a preponderance of evidence, not beyond a reasonable
doubt); Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 122 (1926) (meaning of
preponderance of evidence). In Minnesota, the plaintiff must prove by the higher stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a "willful indif-
ference to the rights or safety of others" in order to recover punitive damages from that
defendant. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1; see alsoJ. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note
80, § 9.12, at 37-38. See generally Comment, supra note 1.
87. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing these contradictory
arguments).
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the defect claim. Such considerations are not relevant to the puni-
tive damages statute88 and plaintiffs are entitled to trial by jury
without courts restricting evidence. A prima facie case on all
claims must be made; and if it is not made, evidence and claims
can be stricken at the conclusion of the case.
d Pretrial Motions
Motions in limine had fallen into disuse a decade ago but are
now the heart of a defendant's attempts to exclude evidence. 89 For
example, a plaintiff's attorney can expect motions to exclude reme-
dial measures and evidence of other claims. Nevertheless, defend-
ants usually want to exclude evidence of remedial measures with
respect to the issue of defect but also want to include such evidence
to show how responsible they are on the punitive issue. Thus, such
motions are often an effort by the defendant to make contradictory
assertions9° and courts need to be informed that the rulings must
be considered in the context of the entire case.
Defendants will often move to strike or seek summary judgment
on punitive damages claims. Plaintiffs should treat this motion as
an opportunity to apprise the court of the misconduct and to alert
the court of the plaintiffs' right to a jury trial on all issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
A successful pretrial strategy in a case involving a punitive dam-
ages claim demands an objective and modern analysis of the issues.
Attorneys can no longer rely on traditional techniques. The pol-
icy, attitudes, economics, insurance considerations, and cumula-
tive nature of these cases must be examined to design a cohesive
pretrial plan.
Plaintiffs, defendants, the courts, and the public will benefit
with these elements in the forefront. First of all, courts will enforce
the plaintiffs' statutory and judicially supported right to punitive
damages. This analysis may also force defendants to reconsider
their actions and attitudes. Defendants may realize that the issue
is not whether the corporation itself is good or bad, but whether
88. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3; supra note 12 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the statutory elements).
89. See Davis, Motions in Limine: Toolsfor a Fair Trial, TRIAL, Nov. 1982, at 90; Rodin,
The Motion in Limine: Its Uses andAbuses, 65 CHI. B. REC. 230 (1984); Saltzburg, Tactics of the
Motion in Linine, LITIGATION, Summer 1983, at 17; Spencer, The Motion in Limine. Pretrial
Tool to Exclude PreAudrial Evidence, 56 CONN. B.J. 325 (1982).
90. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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individuals within the corporation acted with willful indifference.
Moreover, defendants may recognize that by covering up a bad
situation in an effort to reduce claims, they enhance culpability to
destructive levels and violate the law. This approach will also pro-
vide courts and juries with an objective factual basis upon which
to evaluate a punitive damages claim, in the absence of an attor-
ney's subjective advocacy and inconsistent defenses. Above all, an
objective overview will promote the public interest by suppressing
conduct that willfully disregards the rights of others.
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SMALL POWER PRODUCTION IN MINNESOTA
Now that most of the technical barriers to small scale alternative energy
production have been largely overcome, only the institutional barriers remain.
The two articles that follow address the remaining problems that may dis-
courage the estabhshment of these faciitzies. Professor Nel Hamilton ad-
dresses two areas of critical importance." the uniform statewide contract
between the small producer and the utiities, and the price for the buy-back of
power. Without a uniform contract, the small producer faces prohibitively
high transaction costs in negotiating with the utility. Under government reg-
ulations, the buy-back price ofpower produced by the small producer is based
on costs avoided by the utility, but the formula for determining avoided costs is
unsettled Professor Hamilton examines the various components of a uniform
statewide contract and the avoided cost price, and offers suggestions to promote
the development of alternative energy production. Seth Colton and James
Brehl address the issues confronting the under-forty kilowatt cogenerationfa-
cil'ty when it seeks to interconnect with a utility under the Minnesota
Cogenerati'on and Small Power Production Act and the Mnnesota Public
Utility Commission rules.
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